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Abstract
One notable line of argument for epistemic relativism appeals to considerations to do with non-neutrality: in certain dialecti-
cal contexts—take for instance the famous dispute between Galileo and Cardinal Bellarmine concerning geocentrism—it 
seems as though a lack of suitably neutral epistemic standards that either side could appeal to in order to (non-question-
beggingly) resolve their first-order dispute is itself—as Rorty (Philosophy and the mirror of nature, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1979) influentially thought—evidence for epistemic relativism. In this essay, my aim is first to present a 
more charitable reformulation of this line of reasoning, one that is framed not merely in terms of the availability of epistemic 
norms that are suitably neutral between interlocutors, but in terms of the availability of what I call Archimedean metanorms. 
Once this more charitable line of argument is developed, I show how, even though it avoids problems that face ‘non-neutrality’ 
versions of the argument, it nonetheless runs into various other problems that appear ultimately intractable and, further, that 
the strategy in question gives us no decisive reason to draw the relativist’s conclusion rather than the Pyrrhonian sceptic’s.
Keywords Epistemic relativism · Relativism and epistemology · Metaepistemology · Disagreement
“Give me a fulcrum on which to 
rest, and I will move the earth.” 
—Archimedes.
1  Scepticism, Relativism and Disagreement
Allegedly irresolvable disagreements have played impor-
tant philosophical roles in the history of scepticism and 
(of most interest for our purposes) relativism. In the Pyr-
rhnonian tradition, ‘disagreement’ is one of the Five Modes 
of Agrippa1—viz., one of five dialectical strategies (along 
with infinite regress, relativity, hypothesis, and reciprocity) 
intended to induce suspension of judgment. In Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus says:
The mode deriving from disagreement is that by means 
of which we discover that, with regard to the matter 
proposed, there has arisen, both in ordinary life and 
among philosophers, an undecidable dispute owing 
to which we end up in suspension of judgment, since 
we are not able to choose or to reject anything. (PH I 
165–169)2
The injunction of suspension of judgment would in no 
way be motivated by the presence of disagreement if it were 
(epistemically) permissible to decide what was so without 
taking into account the presence of differing opinion. But 
the discovery of a differing opinion, according to the Pyr-
rhonian, is supposed to be—at least when the opinions in 
competition are suitably balanced3—constraining on what 
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we are in a position to permissibly decide. Consider further 
that it would not be constraining if both parties of the dispute 
could at the same time be equally right.4 Thus, as Markus 
Lammenranta (2008, p. 18) notes, an implicit premise in the 
Agrippan mode of disagreement, qua dialectical strategy 
aimed at suspension of judgment, is that at most one party 
to any such ‘undecidable’5 or irresolvable dispute is right; 
he presents the crux of the idea as follows:
1. S1 believes that p.
2. S2 believes that p.
3. At most one of them is right.6
4. The disagreement between S1 and S2 is irresolvable.
5. We should suspend judgment about p.
While the Pyrrhonian line on the epistemic significance 
of irresolvable disagreement presupposes (3), the Pyrrhonian 
doesn’t explicitly try to argue for (3). In this respect, the Pyr-
rhonian sceptic is much like the contemporary conciliation-
ist in the peer disagreement literature (e.g., Elga 2007; Feld-
man 2007). According to the conciliationist, certain kinds of 
disagreements—viz., revealed peer disagreements—should 
lead us to withhold judgment (or at least significantly lower 
our credence in the target proposition). And the rationale 
for this quasi-sceptical conclusion also takes for granted a 
premise like (3).
But what if the very presence of disagreements with 
certain kinds of epistemic features was itself a reason to 
reject (3)? If this were so, then the Pyrrhonian line from 
disagreement to scepticism turns out to be a set of jointly 
inconsistent claims disguised as an argument. And with (3) 
omitted from the reasoning, it’s hard to see how any kind 
of sceptical conclusion would follow from observed facts 
about irresolvable disputes.7 Even more, if the presence of 
an irresolvable dispute8 gave us reason to reject the realist/
objectivist9 (3), it would at the same time be a boon—as 
some thinkers have reasoned—for relativism.
To see how this is so, just consider Richard Rorty’s (1979, 
pp. 328–333) oft-cited example of the seventeenth century 
dispute between Cardinal Bellarmine and Galileo concern-
ing the truth of the matter of whether the sun revolved 
around the earth, a view Bellarmine affirmed on the basis 
of Scripture. Relevant to this dispute, Galileo maintained, 
was that moons could be observed orbiting Jupiter, evidence 
that, contra geocentrism, not everything revolves around the 
earth.
The epistemic features of the situation between Galileo 
and Bellarmine are summarised nicely by Harvey Siegel 
(2004) as follows:
Not only did the two parties disagree as to the truth of 
the relevant claim—Galileo affirmed the existence of 
the moons, while his opponents denied it—they also 
disagreed about the relevant standards (telescopic 
observation? naked eye observation? Scripture? Aris-
totle?) to which appeal should be made in order to 
resolve their disagreement […] Any proposed meta-
standard that favors regarding naked eye observation, 
Scripture, or the writings of Aristotle as the relevant 
standard by which to evaluate “the moons exist” will 
be judged by Galileo as unfairly favoring his opponents 
since he thinks he has good reasons to reject the epis-
temic authority of all these proposed standards. [L]
ikewise, any proposed meta-standard that favors Gali-
leo’s preferred standard, telescopic observation, will 
be judged to be unfair by his opponents, who claim 
to have good reasons to reject that proposed standard 
(2004, p. 751).
In short, it looks like Galileo and Bellarmine’s dispute 
runs very deep indeed; they disagree not only about whether 
7 For discussion on this point, see Carter (2016, Chaps. 3–5).
8 A point of clarification: some disagreements may not in fact be 
resolvable due to entirely practical concerns—e.g., a party to the dis-
pute becomes tired, or loses her vocal chords, or both become bored 
or simply ‘agree to disagree’ to keep the peace. Each of these expla-
nations for the practical irresolvability of a disagreement, though, 
seem to be irrelevant to whether we should draw any interesting phil-
osophical conclusion.
9 Note that by denying (3), one thereby parts ways with the objectiv-
ity of the truth of the proposition that is the subject of the dispute. 
Maintaining (3), by contrast, comports with views that have variously 
been described as ‘realist’ (Cuneo 2007), ‘absolutist’ (Boghossian 
2006; MacFarlane 2014). For discussion, see Baghramian and Carter 
(2015).
5 For discussion on this translation from Greek, see Barnes (2007, p. 
19). The original Greek, according to Barnes, implies that the term 
for ‘undecided’ indicates that the argument in question ‘awaits deci-
sion’, and so the implication is that ‘for all the sceptic knows, the 
disagreement might, in the future, be resolved’ (2007, p. 19). In this 
respect, the Pyrrhonian sceptic is importantly different from the Aca-
demic sceptic, who will assert conclusively that a given disagreement 
will never be resolved.
6 It is worth noting that the move from (1) and (2) to (3) is not one 
that concerns the epistemic status (e.g., justification) of the conflict-
ing beliefs; rather, the claim reached on the basis of (1) and (2) is that 
at least one party must hold a false belief. This point, which rests just 
on the idea that conflicting beliefs can’t both be true, does not imply 
any particular position with respect to what it is rational to do in the 
face of disagreement.
4 The contemporary term for arguments with this feature is ‘faultless 
disagreement’. This term, however, is typically associated with a lin-
guistic strategy type for a form of relativism which is different from 
the motivation for relativism that will be the focus of this paper. For 
further clarification on this point, see Footnote 13.
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moons orbit Jupiter. But they also disagree about what kinds 
of evidence are even relevant to settling the question. Moreo-
ver, it doesn’t appear that either is in a position to settle 
this second-order question about evidence without begging 
the question vis-à-vis what counts as evidence10; after all, it 
looks very much as though there is no meta-standard either 
could appeal to which would be suitably neutral in their 
dialectical context. And Rorty’s assessment from such con-
siderations is that we should conclude that each is justified 
relative to his own ‘epistemic grid’ or epistemic system,11 
and that nothing more can be said.12
As Siegel puts it in characterising Rorty’s pro-relativist 
diagnosis of the Bellarmine/Galileo dispute, “the absence of 
neutral (meta-) standards seems to make the case for rela-
tivism” (2004, p. 751). This is a remarkable piece of rea-
soning,13 and one that takes us a long way from where the 
Pyrrhonian would have been led.
2  No Neutrality, Therefore Relativism
In short, if relativists like Rorty are right, then the purported 
fact that there was no suitably neutral meta-standard avail-
able to Bellarmine and Galileo to which to appeal to ration-
ally resolve their dispute is a fact with pro-relativist import. 
And more generally, what this means is that considerations 
about non-neutrality, in actual, concrete dialectical contexts, 
are relativism-relevant.
Following Siegel (2011), we may refer to this general line 
of reasoning on behalf of the relativist—one that has been 
defended recently by Hales (2014)14—as the ‘No Neutrality, 
Therefore Relativism’ template argument strategy. The key 
premises of the argument—framed in terms of the Galileo/
Bellarmine debate often taken as a reference point15—are 
as follows:
2.1  No Neutrality, Therefore Relativism
6. There can be a non-relative resolution of the dispute 
concerning the existence of the moons, only if there is 
available an appropriately neutral meta-norm.
7. In the context of the dispute between Galileo and Bel-
larmine, no such appropriately neutral meta-norm is 
available.
8. Therefore, it’s not the case that there can be a non-rela-
tive resolution of the dispute concerning the existence 
of the moons.
9. Therefore, epistemic relativism is true.
Obviously, (8) doesn’t entail (9). We’d need some further 
‘bridge’ premise16 connecting the truth of epistemic relativ-
ism with the claim that there can be no non-relative resolu-
tion of the dispute in question. We’ll return to this point.
But what to make of (6) and (7)? Premise (7) maintains 
that, in the context of the dispute between Galileo and Bel-
larmine, no such appropriately neutral meta-norm is avail-
able. But what sense of ‘availability’ is the relevant one 
here? Relatedly: what, exactly, is unavailable? Moreover, as 
is relevant to (6), why should the capacity of interlocutors to 
locate such a norm in this or similar dialectical contexts mat-
ter for the purposes of assessing whether relativism is true?
Assessing the relativist’s move from (irresolvable) disa-
greement to relativism requires that we get some grip on 
these questions. In what follows, I hope to make some head-
way on this score. The remainder of the paper will accord-
ingly be organised around two broad questions, the elusive-
ness question and the relevance question.
Elusiveness question: What exactly is the thing (i.e., 
appropriately neutral metanorm?) that Galileo and Bel-
larmine are said to be unable to locate in this dialecti-
cal context? In what sense is this thing unavailable to 
them?
Relevance question: And why should it matter 
whether they could (or could not) locate such a thing, 
10 See, for instance, Fogelin (1985), Campolo (2007) and Siegel 
(2013) for additional discussions of features that mark deep disagree-
ments in argumentation theory.
11 Rorty (1979, p. 331) takes the term ‘grid’ from Foucault.
12 Put another way: there is no epistemic-grid- or epistemic-system-
neutral vantage point from which to say who is right and who is 
wrong.
13 Note that the kind of move under consideration here is distinct 
from linguistically motivated ‘faultless disagreement’ arguments 
(e.g., Kölbel 2004; MacFarlane 2007). For one thing, faultless-dis-
agreement-style arguments maintain on the basis of our patterns of 
using a given term that a truth-relativist semantics best accommo-
dates that pattern of use. This is the case both when the expression 
given the relativist treatment by the proponent of faultless disagree-
ment is a non-epistemic expression (e.g., ‘tasty’) as well as when it 
is an epistemic expression (e.g., ‘knows’). Secondly, faultless-disa-
greement-style arguments are not going to regard any one particular 
historical dispute as conclusive evidence for the claim that the disa-
greement in question is faultless. Any one case would, within a fault-
less-disagreement-style argument, be considered inconclusive data 
from which to extrapolate such a conclusion. By contrast, the kind of 
move under discussion here maintains that single cases (such as Gali-
leo vs. Bellarmine) are, in principle, sufficient evidence for relativ-
ism. For an overview of different sources of motivation for (different 
forms of) epistemic relativism, see Baghramian and Carter (2015).
14 I’ve criticised the substantive details of Hales’s interesting ver-
sion of this template argument elsewhere (e.g., Carter 2016, Chap. 4, 
2018a). Here, my focus is on the general strategy type.
15 This is due in the main to Rorty (1979) Boghossian (2006) so 
MacFarlane (2008).




in the context of their dispute? Why should the matter 
of whether epistemic relativism is true turn on these 
kinds of facts? What considerations are relevant in 
determining this?
In what follows, I’ll aim to answer these questions, 
though not in a way that will be congenial to the relativist. 
Here is the plan for what follows: first, I’ll show how engag-
ing with the elusiveness question leads us naturally to see 
how to frame a more promising case than relativists have 
offered thus far for defending a version of the ‘No Neutrality, 
Therefore Relativism’ argument, one framed not in terms of 
mere neutrality, but in terms of Archimedean metanorms. I’ll 
then show—with reference to both the elusiveness question 
and the relevance question—how even this more promising 
strategy runs ultimately into dead ends, and that the under-
lying problems that lead to these dead ends are intractable 
ones. At the end of the day, the relativist’s move from pur-
portedly irresolvable disagreements to relativism is on no 
better ground than is the Pyrrhonian’s move from such cases 
to the rival sceptical conclusion.
3  The Elusiveness Question
What exactly is the thing (i.e., appropriately neutral 
metanorm) that Galileo and Bellarmine are said to be una-
ble to locate in their dialectical context? And in what sense 
is this thing unavailable to them? Settling these issues is 
needed in order to work out in a principled way whether (7) 
of the No Neutrality, Therefore Relativism argument is true 
or false.17
For starters, Galileo and Bellarmine could each locate 
(e.g., point to, assert, etc.) a meta-standard (or many meta-
standards)—viz., standards that specify what kinds of evi-
dence are permitted in the context of the first-order dispute 
about moons. The problem is just that for any such meta-
standard (be it a rule or a normative principle18) one would 
be inclined to put forward, it seems that the other would 
be inclined to reject it. And so what (7) of the argument 
maintains is that neither can locate an appropriately neutral 
one. Both relativists such as Rorty and anti-relativists such 
as Siegel (2004, p. 751) and Boghossian (2006, pp. 61–62) 
are thinking of ‘appropriate neutrality’ in terms of some-
thing like ‘non-question-beggingness’ within a dialectical 
context, as follows:
Appropriate neutrality (i.e., non-question-begging-
ness): A metanorm, M, is appropriately neutral (i.e., 
non-questions-begging) between two systems S1 and 
S2 (in context D) iff either M is basic (primitive) or 
self-justifying in S1 and S2, or in cases where it is 
neither in either system, it can, in either system, be 
derived entirely from other principles of that system.19
If we read premise (7) with the above gloss of ‘appropri-
ately neutral’ (as it features in the premise), the idea would 
be: in the context of their dispute about moons, Galileo and 
Bellarmine can’t locate a metanorm that is either primitive 
or self-justifying in both systems or derivable entirely from 
other principles of both systems.
The problem is, though, that there obviously are some 
metanorms that have this property and which are available 
(in any plausible sense of ‘available’) to both parties. Take, 
for example, a tautologous meta-norm Infer X from X (or 
an associated epistemic principle according to which infer-
ences that follow the pattern ‘Infer X from X’ are permis-
sible). Plausibly the metanorm Infer X from X would be 
regarded as primitive in both systems. And the same goes 
for modus ponens, the law of the excluded middle and other 
such ‘super-thin’ metanorms. But, given that these kinds of 
super-thin metanorms are clearly available to both interlocu-
tors, Galileo and Bellarmine, to (non-question-beggingly) 
appeal to in the context of their dispute, premise (7)—given 
the traditional ‘appropriate neutrality’ gloss of what it is 
that these interlocutors are said to be unable to locate—is 
manifestly false.
What this suggests is that the ‘No Neutrality, Therefore 
Relativism’ template argument attributed to the relativist 
needs a more charitable reconstruction than it’s usually 
given (both by proponents and critics). In particular, what’s 
needed is a more plausible version of (7).20 Making (7) more 
plausible requires (in short) adding to the description of 
what it is that Galileo and Bellarmine can’t find. It has to be 
more than merely a metanorm that is appropriately neutral 
in the sense discussed.
What should such a description involve? Consider that 
while neither Bellarmine nor Galileo is in a position to 
17 Of course, certain kinds of problems for satisfying (7) will also 
make mischief for the relativist who relies on (6); and indeed, some 
of the specific problems I’ll raise here for (7) do in fact raise prob-
lems for (6)—especially as ‘availability’ features in both premises. 
Accordingly, in developing problems for the relativist who wants to 
defend (7), I am not suggesting that (6) should be ‘granted’ or is oth-
erwise unproblematic. On the contrary, I have in previous work on 
the ‘No Neutrality, Therefore Relativism’ argument, focused primar-
ily on problems to do with (6). For a discussion of these problems, 
see in particular Carter (2016, Chap 4, 2018b).
18 We’ll return later to the significance of this difference. For now, 
I’m using ‘meta-standard’ and ‘metanorm’ inclusively, so that a 
metanorm may be either a rule or a principle.
19 Thanks to the guest editors for suggesting this way of capturing 
the idea.
20 And then we’d need to amend (6) so that, with an amended version 
of (7), (8) would follow.
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object to each other relying on super-thin metanorms, such 
meta-norms are plausibly not going to be appropriately 
discriminatory (i.e., capable of assisting the interlocutors 
to move toward one rather than the other position) in the 
context of their dispute and this precisely because of their 
neutrality. Unsurprisingly, there is another side to this coin: 
a meta-norm that does very well in the discriminatory role 
(viz., by favouring one much more than the other) will plau-
sibly fail to be appropriately neutral.
Putting these points together, a meta-standard can plau-
sibly play the kind of role that it would need to play in order 
to facilitate bringing interlocutors locked into an otherwise 
irreconcilable position to a rational resolution, only if it is 
not merely suitably neutral, but moreover, it must also be 
non-inert (i.e., suitably discriminatory). Call a metanorm 
that is (i) suitably neutral and (ii) suitably non-inert 
Archimedean.
Archimedean metanorm: M is an Archimedean 
metanorm in dialectical context D if and only if M 
is (i) appropriately neutral with respect to epistemic 
standards S1 and S2 in dialectical context D; and (ii) 
non-inert in dialectical context D.
Galileo and Bellarmine could easily find appropriately 
neutral and (utterly) inert metanorms in the context of 
their dispute. But—and I think this better captures Rorty’s 
point—they would have plausibly had more difficulty finding 
any appropriately neutral and non-inert metanorms—viz., 
metanorms the appeal by either to which would be (in some 
suitably specified way) capable of assisting the interlocutors 
to move rationally toward one rather than the other posi-
tion—viz., an end to which Infer X from X (neutral as it may 
be) would be useless.
This all seems, at least initially, like good news for the 
relativist for the following reason: A point that had eluded 
previous attempts to construct a viable ‘No Neutrality, 
Therefore Relativism’ argument can be controlled for by 
simply amending (7) in the argument so that it claims that no 
Archimedean metanorm is available (as opposed to the claim 
that merely no appropriately neutral metanorm is available).
7*. In the context of the dispute between Galileo and 
Bellarmine, no Archimedean meta-norm is available.21
Unlike (7), (7*) is not manifestly false. However, even 
with the improved (7*) in play rather than (7), the underlying 
concerns driving the elusiveness question remain.
4  Three Problems
Thus far, we’ve made some progress in specifying what it is 
that Galileo and Bellarmine are said to be unable to locate in 
their dialectical context (though we’ve yet to engage with the 
matter of what it would be for an Archimedean metanorm 
to be ‘unavailable’). But, as I now want to suggest, even the 
improved formulation—one framed in terms of Archime-
dean metanorms—leaves much more to be answered, and 
this is only magnified when we attempt to unpack the notion 
of ‘unavailability’ in a plausible way.
In this section, the aim will be to show that attempts to 
sharpen the relativist’s argument by addressing the elusive-
ness question reveal a trio of new problems:
 (i) a definitional problem;
 (ii) a methodological problem; and
 (iii) an epistemic problem.
Let’s consider each in turn.
4.1  The Definitional Problem
What counts as ‘non-inert’ in the context at issue—i.e., in 
characterising the kind of Archimedean metanorm that the 
relativist wants to say is not available in cases like Galileo 
versus Bellarmine?22
As we’ve already noted, a suitably non-inert norm must 
at least not be so neutral, in the context of the dispute, that 
appealing to it could not assist the project of rational adjudi-
cation. But what would a positive characterisation look like?
Here is a first pass.
Non-inertness: In a context, D, where (Di) A and B 
disagree about the truth of a proposition p (e.g., heli-
ocentrism), and (Dii) A and B disagree about which 
epistemic standards, S1 or S2 (e.g., Scripture, Science, 
etc.), are relevant to determining the truth of proposi-
tion p, a metastandard M is appropriately non-inert if 
and only if either S1 or S2 is made more probable by M.
Of course, from each perspective, each interlocutor might 
believe a given metanorm makes their own position more 
probable than the other. Moreover, each might be work-
ing with different, subjective and incompatible construals 
of probability (e.g., p is more probable than q if and only 
if the Poison Oracle says that p is more probable than q). 
Such considerations count in favour of an objective notion of 
21 This amendment will also require a tweak to (6) so that (8) fol-
lows—viz., 6*. There can be a non-relative resolution of the dispute 
concerning the existence of the moons, only if there is available an 
Archimedean metanorm.
22 Note that the kind of non-inertness of interest here is not non-
inertness simpliciter, but non-inertness in the context of a disagree-
ment where (i) and (ii) are present.
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probability as the relevant one for the purposes of specifying 
non-inertness.
But then there are two problems. Firstly, many of the 
kinds of metastandards that are appropriately neutral will 
be, or be framed largely in terms of, logical truths, and logi-
cal truths (setting aside caveats) are necessarily true.23 But 
such truths won’t then be useful qua objective probability 
raisers for any one metastandard over another. Secondly, 
and perhaps more problematically, probability raising itself 
may not be recognised within some epistemic systems [e.g., 
that of the characterization of the Azande given by Evans-
Pritchard (1937)24] as having evidential import.25 This 
matters because a definition of an Archimedean metanorm 
should be statable at a level of substantive generality; if it 
is not, then the relativist’s appeal to it will appear ad hoc.
Let’s consider now a different approach to non-inertness:
Non-inertness*: In a context, D, where (Di) A and B 
disagree about the truth of a proposition p (e.g., heli-
ocentrism), and (Dii) A and B disagree about which 
epistemic standards, S1 or S2 (e.g., Scripture, Science, 
etc.), are relevant to determining the truth of proposi-
tion p, a metastandard M is appropriately non-inert if 
and only if S1 and S2 differ in the extent to which, for 
A and B, they depend on the truth of M.
Let ‘E’ be whatever evidence A might adduce in favour 
of S1 and let ‘E*’ be whatever evidence B might adduce 
for S2. Now suppose that, for some meta-standard M, if A 
doubted M, A could rationally believe S1 on the basis of E; 
but, if B doubted M, B couldn’t rationally believe S2 on the 
basis of E*. In such a case, S1 and S2 differ in the extent to 
which (for A and B, respectively) they depend on the truth of 
M.26 Problematically, though, this difference in dependence 
would have as a consequence that at least one of the inter-
locutors (in the above example, B) would be appealing to M 
in a way that the other party may legitimately object to as 
epistemically circular. Such a difference in dependence may 
accordingly potentially hinder rather than help the prospects 
of rational adjudication between interlocutors.
Perhaps we might try then a different tack, one that seems 
to circumvent the worries raised for both Non-inertness and 
Non-inertness*:
Non-inertness**: In a context, D, where (Di) A and B 
disagree about the truth of a proposition p (e.g., heli-
ocentrism), and (Dii) A and B disagree about which 
epistemic standards, S1 or S2 (e.g., Scripture, Science, 
etc.), are relevant to determining the truth of proposi-
tion p, a metastandard M is appropriately non-inert 
if and only if M plays the following functional role: 
if A and B were to correctly identify M as common 
ground between them, A and B couldn’t easily fail 
at (or: would easily enough succeed at) reaching an 
agreement vis-à-vis p (one way or another) if they try.
Non-inertness** is a modal construal of non-inertness, 
one that, in effect, maintains that M is non-inert just in case 
the appeal to it is in a certain respect safely conducive to a 
resolution of the target proposition.27 While this idea might 
seem initially promising, there is a problem: whether or not 
A and B would, or would not, easily reach an agreement if 
they try is almost always a matter of non-epistemic factors, 
such as tiredness, distractions, etc. But these kinds of facts 
are plausibly irrelevant to whether epistemic relativism is 
true; and accordingly, if the non-inertness feature of Archi-
medean metanorms is unpacked along the lines of Non-inert-
ness**, then it becomes hard to see why it should matter for 
the truth of epistemic relativism whether an Archimedean 
metanorm is available or not. (Though this is a problem 
we’ll return to.)
In sum, then, if, in the context of the dispute between Gal-
ileo and Bellarmine, no Archimedean meta-norm is available 
(as the improved version of the No Neutrality, Therefore 
Relativism argument would have it), then what’s not avail-
able is a meta-norm that’s not just appropriately neutral but 
also in some suitably specified sense non-inert. However, 
there is no immediately obvious way to positively charac-
terise non-inertness (as this is a feature of an Archimedean 
metanorm) that will be of use to the relativist.
4.2  The Eureka Problem
Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter of how the 
relativist might suitably articulate ‘non-inertness’ (in giving 
a positive characterisation of an Archimedean metanorm) 
could be overcome. Even so, a methodological problem 
remains.
Question: What exactly is involved in the activity of 
‘finding’ or ‘locating’ an Archimedean metanorm when that 
activity is successful? That is, when do interlocutors actually 
count as finding the thing that (according to the relativist), 
if they didn’t (or couldn’t) find it in the right kind of way in 
the context of their dispute, then this would be motivation 
for relativism? Call this methodological question the ‘eureka 
question’.
24 I make no claims here as to the accuracy of Evans-Pritchard’s 
characterisation of the Azande.
25 It’s interesting to note though, as Hacking (2006) has pointed out, 
there was no probability theory in the West before Pascal.
26 In the language of Pryor (2004, p. 359) may say that Type 4 
dependence is exhibited in one case, but not in the other. 27 See Rabinowitz (2011) an overview of safety as a modal condition.
23 See Gomez-Torrente (2017, §1.1) for helpful discussion.
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One simple answer to the eureka question proceeds as 
follows: what’s involved is just the recognition, by both par-
ties to the dispute, of an Archimedean metanorm, that it is 
common ground between them. In a bit more detail:
Locating Common Belief View (LCBV): There is 
some Archimedean metanorm, M, such that A and B 
both believe that M is true; and through dialogue, A 
and B come to believe that A and B both believe that 
M is true. (E.g., Bellarmine and Galileo both believe 
some basic principle and then recognise that they both 
believe it.)
LCBV offers what is probably the most natural answer 
to the eureka question. If LCBV is correct, then the way 
to read (7*) in the revamped ‘No Neutrality, Therefore 
Relativism Argument’ is as follows: in the context of the 
dispute between Galileo and Bellarmine, no Archimedean 
metanorm is available insofar as it’s not possible (in some 
suitably specified sense of possibility) for both parties to 
‘find’ an Archimedean metanorm, M, in the sense specified 
in LCBV—viz., that it’s not possible for both parties to come 
to believe that both believe M.
There is a hitch with LCBV. Norms (meta- or otherwise), 
strictly speaking, are not believed: they are rules that are fol-
lowed or not followed.28 For example: if the Poison Oracle 
indicates that X, believe X; if it visually seems to you that p, 
then believe p, etc. This much suggests that LCBV should 
be reframed either as a view about (something like) (i) 
mutual recognition of shared norm compliance (as opposed 
to mutual recognition of common norm belief) where the 
norms themselves are not truth-apt and so not believed29; 
or, as a view about (something like) (ii) mutual recognition 
of shared belief, with respect to some (truth-apt) epistemic 
principle, that that epistemic principle is true, where ‘epis-
temic principles’ may be defined, following Boghossian 
(2006), as ‘general normative [sic. truth-apt] propositions’ 
which specify conditions under which a particular type of 
belief is justified (e.g., Beliefs issued by the Bible are justi-
fied, Beliefs supported by our best scientific theories are 
justified.)
A problem with going the first route is that it reduces 
the ‘finding’ of an Archimedean metanorm to reflecting on 
past patterns of norm compliance. This is of no help to the 
relativist, as it would mean unpacking:
7*. In the context of the dispute between Galileo and 
Bellarmine, no Archimedean meta-norm is available.
as
(!)7*. In the context of the dispute between Galileo 
and Bellarmine, no Archimedean meta-norm is such 
that both parties mutually believe they have complied 
with it.
But whereas the relevance of 7* to the conclusion of rela-
tivism is not bizarre, the relevance of (!)7* would be. (For, 
after all, both parties may be well positioned to comply with 
a given Archimedean metanorm in the future even if they 
have not done so in the past.) What this suggests is that the 
relativist is best served by opting for an ‘epistemic principle’ 
gloss of LCBV to the effect that ‘finding’ an Archimedean 
metanorm-cum-epistemic-principle would involve Bellarm-
ine and Galileo both (i) believing of some basic epistemic 
principle that it’s true; and then (ii) recognising that they 
both believe it.
But now a different kind of objection waits in the wings. 
If the ‘epistemic principle’ gloss of LCBV is right, then the 
mere fact of two epistemic expressivists locked in a dispute 
would be evidence for epistemic relativism, simply because, 
qua non-cognitivists, they lack the requisite beliefs! And 
this would be so even if those epistemic expressivists were 
capable of reaching an attitudinal agreement, e.g., if they 
both shared the same pro-attitude.
Even setting these points aside, there may be a more dif-
ficult problem for accounting for what interlocutors would 
actually have to do to find the thing that (according to the 
relativist), if they didn’t (or couldn’t) find in the right kind 
of way in the context of their dispute, this would be motiva-
tion for relativism.
For reference, we may call this further problem the levels 
of doxastic assent problem. Suppose for illustrative purposes 
that something like LCBV is right. Now, suppose that both 
parties to the dispute in question believe that some Archime-
dean metanorm is common ground between them, but sup-
pose further that these interlocutors fail to appreciate of the 
Archimedean metanorm which they both accept and accept 
that the other accepts that it is an Archimedean metanorm 
in the context of their dispute. Locating an appropriately 
neutral and non-inert metanorm in this fashion would not be 
much more helpful in the service of actually bringing both 
interlocutors to a rational resolution than were they to have 
merely located a super-thin (i.e., appropriately neutral) but 
entirely inert metanorm which they appreciate is appropri-
ately neutral.
What this indicates is that (something like) LCBV 
answers the methodological ‘eureka’ question only if we 
28 ‘Following a rule’, in the sense of following an epistemic norm, 
needn’t involve any kind of active reflection on the rule in question. 
For example, one follows the knowledge norm of assertion just in 
case one knows what one asserts, and regardless of whether one is 
trying to follow this norm.
29 Such a principle might be stated as follows: There is some Archi-
medean metanorm, M, such that A and B both comply with M; and 
through dialogue, A and B come to believe that ‘A and B both comply 
with M’ is true. (E.g., Bellarmine and Galileo both comply with basic 
principle and then recognise that they both comply with it).
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added a ‘further belief’ requirement to (whatever version we 
prefer of) LCBV to the effect that: A and B must accept M, 
realise that both A and B accept M, and believe of M that M 
is Archimedean (i.e., suitably neutral and non-inert) in the 
context of their dispute.
This looks better. But things are hardly in the clear. Now 
just imagine that both interlocutors satisfy the above ‘further 
belief requirement’, and yet, have no idea how to use the 
Archimedean metanorm (which each accepts, accepts the 
other accepts, and believes to be Archimedean in the context 
of their dispute) to resolve their first-order disagreement.
Now it seems yet a further belief requirement is needed 
to the effect that, for some w, w is the way to use M to reach 
a resolution. The doxastic ascent problem is now in full 
swing. For as Ryle (1945) has pointed out—following Car-
roll (1895)—it’s always possible for one to know of some 
way that that’s the way to do something without being able 
to do the thing in question. In Ryle’s example, a student is 
given fact after fact about how to draw an inference, and yet 
it remains conceivable that despite believing (and perhaps 
even knowing) this (large) set of facts about how to draw the 
inference, the pupil remains unable to do so.
Ryle’s own assessment of the situation is that the student, 
in the circumstance described, failed to know how to draw 
an inference despite the stock of propositional knowledge 
the student had, and correlatively, that possessing relevant 
know-how required ability and not just propositional knowl-
edge. We needn’t take a stand on what know-how involves to 
see already what might look like a way to stop the increas-
ing levels of doxastic ascent. The idea is to simply add an 
ability condition. The relevant requirement then would be 
that A and B must (i) accept M, (ii) realise that both A and 
B accept M, (iii) believe of M that M is Archimedean (i.e., 
suitably neutral and non-inert) in the context of their dispute, 
(iv) believe (correctly) for some w, w is the way to use M 
to reach a resolution, and (v) possess jointly the ability to 
resolve their dispute with reference to M.
Unfortunately for the relativist, even at this stage, another 
level of doxastic ascent threatens. For, regarding condition 
(v), just consider that A and B might in fact jointly possess 
the ability to resolve their dispute with reference to M but 
have no idea that they have the ability to do this. And indeed 
such ignorance is actually common.30 Failure to recognise 
such abilities (by failing to having certain further beliefs) 
will presumably lead interlocutors to quit too quickly—it 
might prevent us from intentionally trying to do the things 
that the abilities are abilities to do. But now yet a further 
belief is needed to the effect that the interlocutors (correctly) 
believe that they have such abilities, not merely that they 
have them.
Let’s set aside whether this last move closes the need—
toward the end of answering the eureka question—for fur-
ther levels of doxastic ascent. There is a final related problem 
worth considering, one that takes (given certain empirical 
premises) the form of a dilemma.
Consider that any relativist who embraces a premise like 
7* in an argument for epistemic relativism is committed to 
the more general thesis that it matters for relativism whether 
A and B can, in the context of a given dispute, locate an 
appropriately neutral and non-inert (i.e., Archimedean) 
metanorm. Presumably, if it matters for relativism whether 
A and B can locate an appropriately neutral and appropri-
ately non-inert metanorm, it matters for relativism whether 
A, B and C can (in the context of a dispute between A, B and 
C) locate such an appropriately neutral and appropriately 
non-inert metanorm.
This suggests the relativist will be plausibly committed 
to the following iteration principle:
Iteration principle: For any finite number of inter-
locutors I and any deliberative context D, if it matters 
for relativism whether the interlocutors I can locate in 
D an appropriately neutral and appropriately non-inert 
(i.e., Archimedean) metanorm, it matters for relativism 
whether I + n, for any interlocutor n who is a mem-
ber of D, can locate such an appropriately neutral and 
appropriately non-inert (i.e., Archimedean) metanorm.
For any relativist who rejects the iteration principle, there 
would need to be a (very) good reason why Galileo and Bel-
larmine’s dispute could serve as a basis for motivating rela-
tivism, given what was not available to them in the context 
of their dispute, even while a hypothetical dispute between 
Galileo and his likeminded assistant and Bellarmine and his 
likeminded assistant, would not.
This doesn’t look promising, and so the relativist should 
really embrace the iteration principle. However, in doing so, 
the relativist runs in to an empirical problem that gives way 
to a dilemma. It is well documented that large groups, when 
deliberating about a given matter (and where the members of 
the group have non-negligible initial leanings) tend to move 
toward more extreme positions than those initially held. For 
example, in a famous study by Moscovici and Zavalloni 
(1969), it was shown that groups (post-deliberation) tend 
to hold stronger political views than those initially held by 
their individual members. Likewise, group racial attitudes 
become stronger after already prejudiced members discuss 
racial issues (Myers and Bishop 1970).31
30 This is so even amongst experts who systematically underestimate 
their levels of ability (e.g., Kruger and Dunning 1999).




This is the phenomenon of group polarisation. Crucially, 
in cases of group polarisation, the very fact of deliberating 
in such contexts (for various reasons) leads to polarisation. 
Which psychological factors cause individuals to move to 
more extreme positions in group contexts is debated. For 
example, according to self-categorization theory (Turner 
1982; Turner et al. 1987) confrontation in a group delibera-
tive setting enhances group membership and self-identity 
in a way that (i) minimizes intragroup differences and (ii) 
maximizes intergroup differences. The crux of the idea is 
that groups polarise because their members try to preserve 
their distinctiveness from other groups. Relatedly, social 
comparison theory (e.g., Festinger 1954) maintains that the 
underlying cause of group polarisation is a need for social 
approval.32 Neither of these underlying causes supports an 
epistemic reason for polarising.
We’re now in a position to state a kind of trilemma for the 
would-be ‘No Neutrality, Therefore Relativism’ relativist. It 
looks as though she has three options, each with an associ-
ated cost. The relativist can either accept or deny the itera-
tion principle. Denying it is unacceptably arbitrary. If she 
accepts it, then she can either (i) allow that non-epistemic 
considerations (e.g., biases of the sort that lead to polarisa-
tion in groups) which lead to a lack of agreement are relevant 
to the truth of relativism, or she can deny this and maintain 
that only epistemic considerations which lead to a lack of 
agreement are relevant to the truth of relativism. The for-
mer route is unprincipled; the latter route at best leaves the 
relativist in need of further argument.
4.3  The Epistemic Problem
I’ve suggested that attempts to sharpen the relativist’s ‘No 
Neutrality, Therefore Relativism’ argument by addressing 
the elusiveness question reveal a trio of new problems: (i) 
a definitional problem, (ii) a methodological problem and 
(iii) an epistemic problem. The definitional and methodo-
logical problems have been discussed. Let’s turn now to the 
epistemic problem.
Suppose for the sake of argument that the doxastic ascent 
problem can be dealt with by the relativist, along with the 
definitional and other problems. Let’s now suppose that the 
following claim, congenial to the relativist, is true:
Unlocatability (datum): Sometimes, it is not possible 
for interlocutors to locate an Archimedean metanorm 
in the context of their dispute in an epistemically sat-
isfactory way.
The qualification ‘in an epistemically satisfac-
tory way’ is meant to control for the following: it would 
presumably always be possible to stumble upon an Archi-
medean metanorm accidentally, e.g., just by guessing, for 
any Archimedean metanorm that could be located non-
accidentally. (On such an assumption, for instance, each of 
the requirements specified by the doxastic ascent problem 
would itself be a condition satisfied by, say, guessing). It 
would likewise be possible to stumble upon an Archime-
dean metanorm through the use of reasoning processes that 
are prohibited by the epistemic principles that one already 
accepts. In a case like Bellarmine/Galileo, the relativist pre-
sumably wants to maintain that no Archimedean metanorm 
is available in a way that (in some sense) complies with the 
epistemic principles each already accepts.
Thus, the relevant datum the relativist is pointing to in a 
case like Bellarmine/Galileo, and which is taken to be rela-
tivism-relevant, should not be read as the (unqualified) claim 
that no Archimedean metanorm can be found (by any way, 
including ways that are prohibited by principles each accepts, 
respectively) but rather that no Archimedean metanorm may 
be found in a way that is epistemically satisfactory, at least, 
by the lights of each interlocutor’s respective principles.
Now, if we are assuming, ex hypothesi, that this datum is 
correct, let’s ask, what would best explain it? If the ‘No Neu-
trality, Therefore Relativism’ line for epistemic relativism is 
correct, then the relativist had better have a better explanation 
for this datum than a competing non-relativist explanation.
Consider now, the following proposal which we may call 
epistemicism:
Epistemicism: In some cases, the correct set of epis-
temic principles (including the most general principles, 
such as those that might play the role of ‘M’) are una-
ble to be known/justifiedly believed by interlocutors in 
light of the epistemic principles they already accept.
An epistemicist explanation of the unlocatability datum 
predicts that in some contexts, antecedently embraced epis-
temic principles (e.g., Bellarmine’s allegiance to Scripture) 
might foreclose the possibility of embracing a given Archi-
medean metanorm (or, for that matter, any correct epistemic 
principle) in an epistemically satisfactory way. Accordingly, 
on this way of thinking, some Archimedean metanorms will 
be unknowable (or: unable to be held in an epistemically 
satisfactory way) but in a manner that is compatible with 
objectivism, and more generally, with metaepistemological 
realist views of the epistemic status of epistemic principles 
(e.g., Boghossian 2006; Carter 2016, Chap. 1).
The relativist’s explanation of the unlocatability datum 
says that lack of an epistemically satisfactory location of an 
Archimedean metanorm in actual historical disagreements 
is evidence for relativism. But why prefer the latter to the 
former explanation?
This question at the heart of the epistemic problem con-
nects closely with what was described initially as the relevance 




question—viz., why should it matter (for relativism) whether 
interlocutors could (or could not) locate such a thing, in the 
context of their dispute? Why should the matter of whether 
epistemic relativism is true turn on these kinds of facts?
The burden of proof here remains with the relativist, at 
least, if the relativist purports to offer a better explanation 
of allegedly irresolvable disagreements than objectivist-
friendly explanations of such disagreements.
One specific objectivist-friendly philosophical position 
vis-à-vis irresolvable disagreements is the one offered by 
the Pyrrhonian sceptic, outlined at the beginning of the 
paper. As Hales (2014, p. 81) has suggested—in a recent 
paper defending a version of the ‘No Neutrality, Therefore 
Relativism’ argument—the view advanced by Pyrrhonian 
scepticism amounts to ‘throwing in the towel’, a response 
to sceptical views that is not uncommon.33
In previous work (e.g., Carter 2016, Chaps. 3–4, 2018a, 
b) I’ve offered various reasons for thinking that, if the choice 
were between relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism, there 
are good reasons to throw in with the Pyrrhonian sceptic 
rather than with the relativist.
I won’t rehearse these here. Rather, I want to close by 
pointing out that the meta-epistemological objectivist retains 
a solid position relative to the relativist even if we should (as 
I think we should not) throw in with the relativist rather than 
the Pyrrhonian. In order to see why, it’s important to draw 
a distinction between (a) wholesale Pyrrhonian scepticism; 
and (b) a Pyrrhonian-style response to irresolvable disagree-
ment. The most well-noted philosophical costs associated 
with (a) do not apply to (b). The strength of any form of 
scepticism is a function of (at least) its scope. The scope 
of traditional Pyrrhonian scepticism, as a philosophical 
position, is substantial,34 and the philosophical motivations 
for such a view outstrip whatever motivations are afforded 
by arguments from disagreement. The scope, and thus the 
strength, of (b) may in fact not be very substantial at all; and 
this means the correlative philosophical concession to the 
sceptic may accordingly not be very substantial—viz., just 
those propositions that are the loci of genuinely irresolvable 
disagreements. Such disagreements may in practice be rare. 
At any rate, should the relativist wish to show otherwise, 
she’d need to first be able to identify in a principled way just 
what the markers of such disagreements are. And—if the 
definitional and methodological problems are anything to 
go by—doing this may be easier said than done.35
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